Gujar, Sujit and Yadati, Narahari (2008) Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. In: 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, DEC 17-20, 2008, Shanghai, Peoples republic china, pp. 438-445.Full text not available from this repository.
In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p) with unit demand, satisfying weak budget, balance, individual rationality, and minimizing the budget imbalance. This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. When the objects are identical, this problem has been solved by Moulin  and Guo and Conitzer . However, it remains an open problem to design such a rebate function when the objects are heterogeneous. We propose a mechanism, HETERO and conjecture that HETERO is individually rational and weakly budget, balanced. We provide empirical evidence for our conjecture through experimental simulations.
|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
|Additional Information:||Copyright of this article belongs to Springer.|
|Keywords:||Groves mechanism; Budget imbalance; Redistribution function; Moulin mechanism; Rebate function|
|Department/Centre:||Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation (Formerly, School of Automation)|
|Date Deposited:||03 Dec 2009 10:38|
|Last Modified:||15 Jan 2013 05:46|
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