Biswas, Shantanu and Narahari, Y (2005) Iterative Dutch Combinatorial auctions. In: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 44 (3). pp. 1573-7470.
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The combinatorial auction problem can be modeled as a weighted set packing problem. Similarly the reverse combinatorial auction can be modeled as a weighted set covering problem. We use the set packing and set covering formulations to suggest novel iterative Dutch auction algorithms for combinatorial auction problems. We use generalized Vickrey auctions (GVA) with reserve prices in each iteration. We prove the convergence of the algorithms and show that the solutions obtained using the algorithms lie within provable worst case bounds. We conduct numerical experiments to show that in general the solutions obtained using these algorithms are much better than the theoretical bounds.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Additional Information:||Copyright of this article belongs to Springer.|
|Keywords:||combinatorial auctions;iterative auctions;generalized Vickrey auctions;weighted set packing problem;weighted set covering problem;incentive compatibility;efficiency;e-selling;e-procurement|
|Department/Centre:||Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation (Formerly, School of Automation)|
|Date Deposited:||25 Aug 2005|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2012 06:12|
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