Biswas, S and Narahari, Y (2010) An iterative auction mechanism for combinatorial exchanges. In: Automation Science and Engineering (CASE), 2010 IEEE Conference on , 21-24 Aug. 2010, Toronto, ON.
An_Iterative.pdf - Published Version
Restricted to Registered users only
Download (631Kb) | Request a copy
Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. In this paper, we develop computationally efficient iterative auction mechanisms for solving combinatorial exchanges. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality (IR) and budget-nonnegativity (BN) properties. We also show that our method is bounded and convergent. Our numerical experiments show that our algorithm produces good quality solutions and is computationally efficient.
|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
|Additional Information:||Copyright 2010 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted.However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.|
|Department/Centre:||Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation (Formerly, School of Automation)|
|Date Deposited:||20 Dec 2011 05:46|
|Last Modified:||20 Dec 2011 05:46|
Actions (login required)