Garg, D and Narahari, Y and Foster, Earnest and Kulkarni, Devadatta and Tew, Jeffrey D. (2005) A Groves Mechanism Approach to Decentralized Design of Supply Chains. In: Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology, 2005. CEC 2005, 19-22 July, Munich,Germany, 330 -337.
In this paper, a generic optimization problem arising in supply chain design is modeled in a game theoretic framework and solved as a decentralized problem using a mechanism design approach. We show that the entities in a supply chain network can be naturally modeled as selfish, rational, and intelligent agents interested in maximizing certain payoffs. This enables us to define a supply chain design game and we show that the well known Groves mechanisms can be used to solve the underlying design optimization problem. We illustrate our approach with a representative three stage distribution process of a typical automotive supply chain.
|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
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|Department/Centre:||Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation (Formerly, School of Automation)|
|Date Deposited:||25 Nov 2005|
|Last Modified:||19 Sep 2010 04:21|
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